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25 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with [REDACTED] on a 25X9A8  
DIA-produced NIPP

25X9A8

1. [REDACTED] opened the conversation by asking what CIA would be willing to contribute to a DIA-produced NIPP. I answered that it really depended on what inputs DIA needed and how much time it would take us. We then moved to the question of whether the last three sections of the NIPP (Manpower, Economic, and Nuclear Materials) were really needed by military planners on an annual basis. I said it appeared to me that of these three only the Manpower section would be worth doing annually. The other two could be done every three years or so or when it appeared the force estimates were getting very large. [REDACTED] said he would consult with Systems Analysis and others in the Pentagon to see whether there was any real need for these three sections on an annual basis.

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2. [REDACTED] then brought up the question of CIA coordination. He asked whether assigning a CIA man to DIA to work on the NIPP would take care of "the coordination problem". I answered emphatically no. I made it quite clear that we would find it very difficult to agree with a proposal that CIA approve, coordinate, or concur in an entire DIA-produced NIPP. Such a process would mean that we would have to spend almost as much time as we now do to give us the kind of assurance we need for endorsing the document. It seemed to me that there were thousands of numbers in the NIPP, only a few of which were critical to US force decisions. Some of these we could identify beforehand, but many others would not appear critical until after the Department of Defense had carried out thorough weapons systems analyses.

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25X9A8 3. This led me to the recommendation that DIA should produce the NIPP without CIA approval (assuming that the NIPP would be consistent with the NIEs). After the JCS, Systems Analysis, DDR&E, or the Services had identified those estimates which were critical to US force decisions, then CIA could be asked to comment and coordinate on these critical items. Under this kind of arrangement we would not be dissipating our resources on the large number of inconsequential estimates but would be able to focus our limited resources on those estimates which really count. [REDACTED] was receptive to this idea.

4. There was considerable discussion about the potential roles of Systems Analysis, DDR&E, JCS, the Defense Intelligence Board, and the NSC Defense Program Review Committee. It was obvious that the roles of these organizations as contributors to or users of the DIA-produced NIPP needed further clarification.

25X9A8 5. As a result of our conversation, [REDACTED] said that he would inquire in the Pentagon and determine what inputs might be necessary to a DIA-produced NIPP. After that is determined, we will be in a better position to assess the impact on us and to decide what we can and should do.

25X9A8 6. [REDACTED] discussed the possibility of DIA obtaining John  
25X1A9a [REDACTED] services. I said that [REDACTED] was on the ONE Staff, and 25X1A9a  
I could not determine his availability. It was clear that [REDACTED] 25X9A8  
was considering at least two options: one, whether [REDACTED] could 25X1A9a  
be loaned to DIA during the transition period; and two, whether  
25X1A9a [REDACTED] should be permanently assigned to or hired by DIA to do  
25X9A8 the NIPP task. [REDACTED] told me he was next going to talk to [REDACTED] 25X1A9a  
25X1A9a [REDACTED] about this and other matters related to the NIPP.

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Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

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